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Cities are at the centre of politics in Britain today. More than eighty per cent of 
the UK population live in cities and their suburban hinterlands. Around ninety 
per cent of GDP and employment is based in urban locations.i New Labour 
has made the regeneration of urban spaces a key plank of their mission to 
‘modernise’ Britain. At the core of this is the goal of placing Britain’s cities on 
the brink of an ‘urban renaissance’. In February 2005, John Prescott, Deputy 
Prime Minister, claimed that significance improvements have already been 
made to UK cities: 
 
After many decades of industrial change and economic restructuring, 
many of our larger urban areas have begun to show substantial progress 
– underpinned by the long period of economic stability, low 
unemployment and low inflation from our policies. There’s great new 
architecture, expressing a new confidence, and people are coming back 
to the city centres.ii 
 
As soon as they were elected in 1997 the New Labour government set up an 
Urban Task Force under the architect Richard Rogers.iii Its mission statement 
read: 
 
The Urban Task Force will identify causes of urban decline in England 
and recommend practical solutions for bringing people back into our 
cities, towns and urban neighbourhoods. It will establish a vision for 
urban regeneration founded on the principles of design excellence, 
social well-being and environmental responsibility within a viable 
economic and legislative framework.iv 
 
Laudable aims about an improved built, social and natural environment are 
therefore made dependent on the right economic situation. Immediately, the 
suspicion arises that for all the talk about Urban Task Forces, New Labour’s 
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rhetoric disguises a quite different agenda. It forms part of New Labour’s more 
general appeal to a neo-liberal conception of social justice, one couched in a 
rhetoric of social cohesion and social inclusion through paid work. This utilises 
the symbols of communities, culture and ‘social capital’ as a way of managing 
but not reversing the gnawing realties of acute class polarisation and naked 
accumulation. We argue that New Labour’s approach to the city is shot 
through with all the contradictions that mark their broader project. At the heart 
of this is a historical contradiction between planning for social need and 
competitive accumulation, which finds its most marked expression in the 
urban spaces where most of British society lives and works.  
 
Communities and Capitalism 
New Labour inherited from the Tories an approach to urban regeneration 
premised on competition, culture and consumption. To this triumvirate New 
Labour added ‘community’. Communities, based on local neighbourhoods, are 
for New Labour the basic building blocks of social order and cohesion. In 
contrast to Thatcherite New Right politics, for Third Way politics the state and 
capital undertake to enter a ‘partnership’ with communities as an ethically 
pragmatic route to ‘social justice’. For New Labour ‘community’ is narrowly 
conceived as a self-regulating organism overseen by volunteer ‘community 
leaders’. There is no place for struggles from below or any sense of 
‘communities of resistance’.v As the Urban Task Force put it: 
 
Persuading people and organisations to care for their urban environment 
is partly a matter of re-awakening civic pride. Community involvement 
needs to be supported by strong enforcement action to deal with 
vandalism, graffiti, intimidation, noise pollution and other anti-social 
behaviour.vi 
 
In making social order central to the Third Way project, communitarianism 
plays an important moral role in adjusting the individual to the needs of neo-
liberal capitalism.vii Instead of relying on reforms being delivered by planning 
professionals, individuals can overcome the atomisation of market relations 
through acquiring ‘social capital’ for themselves by developing a strong sense 
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of cultural belonging, civic responsibility and mutual cooperation through 
localised networks.viii There is strong nostalgic appeal in such visions for a lost 
golden age of ‘respectable’ working class communities. In so far as these ever 
existed they tended to be organised around the routines of the local 
workplaces that dominated the area. Most of these have gone.  
 
Into this situation, ‘communities’ are given walk-on parts in support of the 
leading role played by the voluntary sector and private business. For John 
Prescott, the public-private initiatives that have been imposed on working 
class areas are at last giving them a voice and acting as ‘nurseries of 
democracy’: 
 
Already more than a million people have become actively engaged in 
their communities. In the past, these people thought that local decision 
making was not for them. They often felt distant and unheard by the 
people in power. But now they are helping to shape the place where 
they live. Programmes such as local strategic partnerships, Sure Start, 
and the New Deal for Communities are nurseries for democracy … 
They’ve unlocked huge untapped energy and experience – giving people 
more influence over the decisions which matter to their community.ix 
 
However, far from the cosy image of a stable site of employment, democracy 
and community identity, Third Way politics aims to expose workers to the new 
instabilities and cut-throat realities of global neo-liberalism. Here the 
contradiction is intensified between architectural design and physical 
appearance, and overcoming social and economic exclusion through 
‘neighbourhood renewal’.x This can only be resolved by a voluntarist 
emphasis on the willingness of ‘communities’ themselves to follow the lead of 
engaged local councillors and tend to the urban fabric of streets, parks and 
other in-between public spaces.  
 
New Labour’s rhetoric about community is yet another counsel of despair. 
Those sections of the working class worst hit by decades of capitalist 
restructuring are to somehow pull themselves out of the circumstances they 
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find themselves mired in. New Labour moralism about individual 
responsibilities and obligations creates an insoluble paradox – the moral 
rhetoric about community is invoked precisely for those communities most 
damaged by capital and reviled by the state.xi Even the term ‘community’ itself 
is suspect. Community has been made to bear all manner of ideological 
inflections from the ‘community charge’ to ‘care in the community’. Although it 
is always seen in a positive light, community is an ‘essentially contested 
concept’ where the same word can take on a wide variety of ideological 
meanings.xii For instance, in the aftermath of the 1981 Brixton riots the official 
report by Lord Scarman seamlessly drifted between at least seven different 
meanings of ‘community’: as a geographical area; as the state; as ethnic 
group; as ‘silent majority’; as hosts; as interest groups; and as informal 
networks.xiii A constant but barely noticeable movement goes on between 
these different and often contradictory meanings, particularly between the 
state as the community’s rational face and the street as the community’s 
irrational face. Despite the calls by socialists for a renewed sense of 
‘community’, in important respects ‘community’ already belongs to capital.xiv 
Community is a category usually reserved by policy-makers for the poorest 
neighbourhoods. Typically, these are cast in terms of ‘social pathology’, where 
the poor are blamed for their own predicament. In this way the basis of 
inequalities as intrinsic to the structures of capitalism can be neatly side-
stepped. Frozen in the form of classless ‘community’ action, working class 
activity becomes the subject of reform experts whose object is to bleed dry 
the class content of urban movements.xv ‘When territorial working class 
community groups arise there is a set of officers and councillors, in a sense 
waiting for them, to whom the community group is of vital relevance and who 
have their own preconceptions which they will bring to bear on its activities’.xvi 
Neither the city nor the community form the unified category imagined in the 
‘progressive’ alliance of Town Planners and Labour councils as somehow 
operating beyond the class dynamics that they embody. In the marketing 
guise of corporate responsibility giant multinationals mobilise the self-same 
rhetoric of community in defence of their own interests. Tesco, for instance, in 
its battle to deregulate ‘community pharmacies’ argued that their own in-store 
pharmacies are also ‘community pharmacies’ since Tesco themselves 
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constitute a ‘community’!xvii  
 
Community-friendly urban design fills up a vacuum created by the absence of 
sustained urban regeneration and widespread prosperity. Although similar 
terms were used in Tory urban policy a quarter of a century ago,xviii good 
design in prestige projects is assumed to be a stamp of social progress and 
urban renewal. Of course, at the heart of this are the design and planning 
professionals and private developers, with or without the participation of the 
community in whose name decisions are made. While we would not want to 
reify or privilege ‘communities’ as somehow possessing complete self-
knowledge of their own predicament, ‘quality’ design solutions are provided by 
private consultants who have little territorial or social connection to the 
working class whose everyday space they aim to govern by managing the 
appearance of the urban environment. Instead, we would propose a more 
active politics of the city as growing out of the struggles not only to protect 
local services and defend jobs but to connect these to wider questions of the 
state and capitalism. This avoids two problems. On one side, those that see 
New Labour’s urban turn agnostically as opening a new ‘articulation’, or 
relationship, between the state and civil society, where ‘urban renaissance’ is 
‘not in itself good or bad, but it is not neutral either’.xix Here, a more positive 
engagement with New Labour’s ambiguous advocacy of ‘sustainable 
communities’ is seen as a viable option. On the other side, there are those 
that see the ‘urban renaissance’ in terms of anti-Modernist design values. 
Here the post-war reconstruction of British cities was a brutalist failure of 
architectural ideology: ‘the root of all this was the dominance of modernist 
ideology among the architectural elite’.xx  
 
It was less ideology, Modernist or otherwise, that produced the crisis of mass 
housing for the working class. More relevant is the role of urban planning in 
different stages in the development of capitalism. From Merseyside, 
Middlesbrough and Dundee in the UK to Ireland’s beacon of modernity in the 
Ballymun estate in Dublinxxi, the post-war creation of deracinated housing 
estates, tower blocks and New Towns was an orderly reformist response to 
the ‘slash and burn’ approach to clearing inner city slums, itself made 
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necessary by the shift from liberal capitalism to state capitalism. Then, the 
construction of the urban landscape was integral to the wider programme of 
national accumulation under direct state supervision and management. In the 
current restructuring, urban planning has to face the contradictory demands of 
neo-liberal capitalism, in which the pivotal element is reconciling economic 
competitiveness and social cohesion. Its importance and centrality to New 
Labour’s urban renaissance programme should not be underestimated. Thus, 
the launch in 1998 of the National Neighbourhood Renewal Programme (in 
England) was about combining area specific programmes for ‘zones’ as in 
Education Action Zones, Health Action Zones, with New Deal programmes, 
which are about tackling ‘worklessness’ and increasing labour force 
participation. New Labour social policies and area-based programmes are 
premised on local labour control and the fragmentation and disciplining of 
labour in the context of a residualised labour market. There is a constant 
emphasis on the need to include disadvantaged areas in the drive to enhance 
national competitiveness on the basis that Social Inclusion realise greater 
economic gains for the UK economy. Assorted area-based strategies and 
public-private partnerships and local based regeneration programmes – all 
involving greater market input – are part of the neo-liberalisation of the UK 
state and economy. Social exclusion and a lack of social cohesion in run-
down inner city areas and peripheral estates are now regarded as a source of 
economic inefficiency, hindering economic competitiveness and flexibility. 
 
 
Planning and Profit 
Urban planners have often been cast in a heroic role, protecting the public 
from shoddy contractors and ameliorating the short-term drive for profit by 
speculators. Many socialists seem to share this rose-tinted view of planners 
who are ‘charged in the main with regulating and alleviating the worst 
excesses which occur when you build for short term profit’.xxii Planning the city 
has been skewed historically by the undemocratic practices of Town Planning. 
Consolidated by the 1947 Town Planning Act, Town Planning emerged as a 
profession in Britain, as elsewhere, precisely in order to mediate the 
contradiction between the social need for liveable spaces and capital’s need 
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for spatial concentrations of labour power. As such Town Planning became 
the preserve of state-sanctioned technical experts. As a de-politicised and 
classless realm urban planning supported an ideology of spatial determinism, 
where antagonistic social relations could be tethered by how people are 
arranged in space. For instance, the dominant response to the inner city riots 
in Brixton, Toxteth and Moss Side in 1981 and Handsworth and Broadwater 
Farm in 1985 was that discontent could be managed by better ‘design 
solutions’ to control the social problems occurring within urban space. Urban 
space is treated in an abstract, neutral way, with the overall goal to create an 
urban order divorced from class content. For some on the left, the problem 
with Town Planning was that it was not sufficiently socialist. Labour-controlled 
councils would remedy this lack of democracy by ensuring some measure of 
community involvement. New Labour are able to mobilise such rhetoric about 
a fall from a golden age of planning to encourage communities to identify with 
new partnership arrangements with private developers. As Prescott puts it: 
 
Decades ago people were ambitious about planning. It meant New 
Towns, Garden Cities, clearing slums, creating new communities … But 
over a period of time, planning became inefficient and ossified. It failed 
to see the connections between planning and the wider needs of the 
community. And it became tied up in its own bureaucracy. So, in 1997, 
we inherited a creaking planning system in need of reform.xxiii 
 
But democratic participation in planning for municipal socialism was always 
secondary to the technical expertise of the planners, architects, building 
contractors and the local leadership role played by fair-minded people of 
‘good will’.  
 
In the past few decades the apparent class neutrality of planning confronts a 
fundamental problem. Urban policies are based increasingly on destabilising 
forms of competition between cities for scarce investment from both state and 
private capital. For the New Right planning inhibited private-led regeneration 
and needed to be deregulated. But, as the experience under the Tories 
showed, landowners and developers actually need the legal, financial and 
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political stability and predictability that planning provides.xxiv Urban 
regeneration strategies thus depend on ‘tax incentives’ and ‘streamlined 
planning consent’ to attract larger amounts of inward investment from private 
capitals that have become mythologised by New Labour ideologues as 
perfectly mobile and fixed to no place in particular. Planning is deregulated as 
an adjunct to smoothing the activities of private investment funds. As the 
Urban Task Force put it:  
 
The land use planning system … is not attuned to the complexity and 
diversity of the urban condition. It often takes too long to reach decisions 
and there is too great an emphasis on controlling development. We need 
urban planning arrangements that are more coherent, more streamlined 
and more actively committed to making things happen. We want to see a 
more flexible approach to planning. Too many authorities adhere rigidly 
to employment and other non-residential zoning for sites with no 
demand.xxv 
 
Local councils enter into partnership with developers and speculators to re-
brand their city as a physically enticing place to do business and one that 
also, coincidentally, has pools of relatively cheap and skilled labour. Planning 
is made the subordinate partner, facilitating urban developers and the shiny 
surfaces of the built environment. Urban entrepreneurs and multinational 
capital are now exalted by Labour councils, who find themselves complicitly 
caught-up in an unremitting inter-city competition for investment and 
concentrating on divisive developments to accommodate the more lucrative 
needs of the affluent middle class. When planners talk about mixed-tenure 
housing they never have in mind locating the impoverished working class in 
middle class parts of town. 
 
Public-Private Partnerships imported from the US the idea that the use of 
public finance could be used to leverage greater amounts of capital out of 
private speculators.xxvi New Labour seek a pragmatic middle path between 
privately-driven forms of US ‘New Urbanism’ and publicly-driven European 
forms: 
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Compared to America, British governments have been much more 
interventionist. But heavy-handed government control won’t work on its 
own. The old Soviet command economies showed that! And we also 
know that a totally free market driven solution hasn’t been totally 
successful either. So when it comes to out communities, planning for the 
future – the Government’s role is to provide an enabling framework and 
influence the market for the public good. That’s why we’ve reformed our 
planning system to link housing, transport and economic development at 
the regional level, help narrow the economic gap, create mixed 
communities, help protect the countryside, reverse the growth of out of 
town retail, and encourage people and retailers back into out city 
centres.xxvii 
 
Planning should ‘enable’ and ‘facilitate’ the market for socially desirable ends. 
The Urban Task Force sees the role of the public sector as one of ‘pump-
priming’ for private investment, in other words to transfer investment risk from 
the private sector to the public sector: 
 
One of the most efficient uses for public money in urban regeneration is 
to pave the way for investment of much larger sums by the private sector 
… Our principal concern in relation to private finance is the market’s 
failure to provide the kind of medium and long-term risk capital that 
complex area regeneration projects require. Government can help to 
attract this kind of investment by enabling funders to spread their 
investment risk more effectively.xxviii 
 
This is a highly precarious way to plan the city, if it can be called planning at 
all. Not only is it a blatant form of using public money to subsidise private 
capital but it depends on a naïve view, at best, on the part of politicians of how 
finance markets work. Take the much-celebrated 1980s London Docklands 
project which faced a disastrous crisis following the 1987 Wall Street crash. 
Its legacy is one of monumental folly. In less than a decade private 
speculation, constantly ‘pump-primed’ by the state, created luxury housing for 
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the few but little in the way of new jobs. Instead, deregulated planning 
produced a mini-crisis of the overproduction of office space in huge glass-
clad, white-collar warehouses.xxix 
 
 
Skin-deep city boosterism 
Urban boosterism demands that Town Planners abandon the staid traditions 
of incremental improvement schemes and support more speculative ventures 
in ‘prestige’ developments, as well as easing the passage of private housing 
schemes, shopping malls and retail parks. Spectacular schemes are adopted 
to give the city, understood metonymically as classless, a competitive edge. In 
London examples of spectacular developments abound, from Canary Wharf, 
which was plunged into receivership in 1991, to the hapless Millennium 
Dome. More recently, what has been called ‘the largest piece of urban 
regeneration and development ever proposed anywhere in the world’, the 
Thames Gateway project, is similarly premised on using state finances to 
bankroll property regeneration.xxx  
 
A renewed emphasis on architectural design fits well with the marketing of 
cities as classless places providing a quality lifestyle for the new middle class. 
In city promotion campaigns, physical appearance is elevated way above 
other priorities such as decent working class housing. Architect-planners want 
to attract people into the city on the basis of their cultural and educational 
training and the opportunities for conspicuous consumption. Waterfront sites 
are developed with culture, heritage and consumption in mind, as in Bristol’s 
harbour, Leith’s dock area, Glasgow Harbour, Dundee Waterfront, London’s 
Tate Modern, and Liverpool’s Tate galleries and the proposed £400 million 
public-private partnership for the redevelopment of the King’s Waterfront, or 
Newcastle’s Baltic gallery and Millennium Bridge. Retail is being used to 
revive city centres like Leeds, Birmingham’s notorious Bullring, and Glasgow, 
with its ‘Golden Z’ of lengthy, shop-lined city centre streets. One-off, 
spectacular architectural projects and marketing campaigns will in this way 
rejuvenate city centres. The appearance of city centre building surfaces is 
now given heightened attention, perhaps unprecedented since the municipal 
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civic pride of the Victorian bourgeoisie. Take the Montevetro Tower built in the 
late 1990s by New Labour’s Urban Task Force chairman, Richard Rogers: 
 
The Montevetro Tower, on the banks of the Thames in Battersea, 
contains some of the most expensive apartments in Britain. The top 
penthouse suite costs £4.5 million. When the first residents arrive in 
July 1999, they will enjoy one of the best views that any building in 
London affords. They can play tennis on the all weather court, relax in 
the sauna and order theatre tickets, limousines and even maids 
through the porter’s lodge. Best of all, they don’t have to share any of 
these luxuries with their neighbours: a security barrier at the entrance 
to the grounds ensures that the hoi polloi in the council estates across 
the road will stay where they belong.xxxi 
 
 
Here, as Walter Benjamin recognised, the parading of ‘cultural treasures’ is 
only made possible by the labour of a working class which is kept concealed 
at all times.xxxii More recently, David Widgery made a similar point about the 
built monuments to capitalist calculation in Canary Wharf: 
 
There is no physical monument to what generations of decent working-
class East Enders have created and given and made and suffered. But 
Cesar Pelli, the architect of fat Canary, tells us that, ‘A skyscraper 
recognises that by virtue of its height it has acquired civic 
responsibilities. We expect it to have formal characteristics for this 
unique and socially charged role’. Now that would be interesting to 
see.xxxiii 
 
At the same time, the physical appearance of many UK city centres and public 
spaces belie the new metropolitan enthusiasm for architecture, design and 
heritage. Where they are not been sold off to private speculators, green public 
spaces like urban parks are being lost or are left in a poor state of up-keep. 
New Labour promises to pour money into green spaces in English cities while 
continuing to encourage private developments on playing fields. But the levels 
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of this have been derisory. The New Opportunities Fund, the main funding 
source for urban parks, play areas and civic squares only managed to allocate 
£3.8million out of a budget of £125 million between 1998 and 2002.xxxiv In 
Scotland, where urban green space is not being made a priority by the 
Scottish Executive, research shows that between 50 and 60 percent view 
urban green spaces like parks as unattractive, unsafe, and poor places for 
children to play.xxxv In city centres, quite distinct places are being flattened out 
by identikit High Street retail units. Retail giants like Tesco have opened their 
Express range of stores in response to this burgeoning market, contributing 
significantly to their record £2 billion profits in 2004, and plan to open another 
1000 over the next few years.xxxvi As one architectural journalist put it, ‘Tesco 
branches are breeding like shrink-wrapped rabbits. Where once we had a 
church in every village, town and city, now we have Tesco with its Extras, 
Metros and Expresses’.xxxvii This is leading to a shift from abandoned city 
centre ‘Ghost Towns’ to what some call ‘Clone Town Britain’.xxxviii  
 
Britain is no longer the nation of shopkeepers, so admired by Adam Smith and 
disdained by Napoleon. If anything, it’s become a nation of shopworkers. 
Cultural conservatives like English Heritage and the London-based Evening 
Standard can rally to defend the cultural loss of ‘our’ idiosyncratic high streets 
being replaced by a bland, homogenising invasion of international retailers, 
with designer clones like Ralph Lauren, DKNY, Starbucks and Gap at the 
expensive end of the city while at the bottom of the pile are found the low 
budget clones of McDonalds, Ladbrokes and Blockbuster. The conservative 
defence of small shopkeepers and family businesses is waged, like New 
Labour’s defence of private finance, in the name of cultural diversity and 
community identity at both local and national levels. Yet the casting of small 
businesses in the role of David against the multinational Goliath’s is, at best, 
misplaced. Local stores like butchers, bakers, fishmongers and newsagents 
have closed at the rate of 50 every week in the UK between 1997 and 2002. 
And Tesco Express stores are undoubtedly having an adverse impact on 
small stores, with around one third reporting drops in business when an 
Express opens close by.xxxix But it is a false choice to pose either the defence 
of small businesses or support for multinational firms, even implicitly. Local 
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corner shops in deprived communities often charge exorbitant prices for low-
grade products, are un-unionised and depend upon low wage labour. That 
doesn’t mean that multinational development ought not to be opposed. They 
operate near-monopolistic practices, ruthlessly exploit labour globally in 
sourcing products and exploit labour locally in selling them.xl While New 
Labour are enforcing new planning policies against out of town retail and re-
use of city ‘brownfield’ sites, this strategy of edge of town retailers re-entering 
the city centre takes advantage of the deeper concentrations of mainly white 
collar workers gathered in city centres. Single-person and dual-worker 
households are doubly exhausted and harassed by workplace intensification 
and the foreshortened time economy of living and working in the 24 hour 
urban economy. For such workers the built environment becomes a blurred 
backdrop, and the creeping standardisation of cities often goes unnoticed. 
 
The pre-eminent example of city-boosterism is Glasgow’s widely-acclaimed 
culture-led regeneration programme.xli As a city beset by long-run industrial 
decline, unemployment and slum housing, Glasgow’s fortunes were 
supposedly restored by attracting back middle class consumers and service 
sector jobs. Between 1971 and 2001 Glasgow shed 197,000 manufacturing 
jobs and acquired 145,000 in services. It now has a much lower proportion of 
manual workers than the UK as a whole and the perverse combination of a 
relatively high labour productivity and a low employment rate within the city.xlii 
Glasgow has become an incessant marketing campaign, emphasising art, 
culture and architecture, designer shopping and luxury apartments in the 
restored bourgeois residential quarter, the Merchant City, through to 2004’s 
risible promotion of the city as Scotland’s fashion answer to Milan: ‘Glasgow: 
The New Black’ or ‘Glasgow: Scotland with Style’. This culminated in 
Glasgow’s self-promotion during the previously unremarkable designation of 
European City of Culture in 1990. Left behind are the working class of 
Glasgow’s large peripheral housing estates, which are in an acute state of 
decay. As a recent study puts it: ‘Working class residents of the core city have 
lost out from this shift in the composition of Glasgow’s economy, while better 
qualified suburban commuters have prospered’.xliii So while the trend away 
from manufacturing employment towards services has deepened in Glasgow, 
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as for all other UK cities, the city has some of the worst poverty and the 
highest mortality rates in Europe. Seven out of the top ten UK constituencies 
for premature deaths are in Glasgow, with life expectancy actually declining in 
some like Shettleston, the UK’s poorest constituency where men have a life 
expectancy of 63 years, ten years less than the Scottish average and 14 less 
than the UK as a whole. As Mooney argues: 
 
The type of strategy adopted in Glasgow – ‘the Glasgow model’ – has 
contributed to the worsening levels of poverty and deprivation and to the 
deepening inequalities that characterise the city today. It has done this 
primarily by constructing Glasgow’s future – and the future of tens of 
thousands of Glaswegians – as a low paid workforce, grateful for the 
breadcrumbs from the tables of the entrepreneurs and investors upon 
which so much effort is spent attracting and cosseting – and by 
marginalizing and ruling out any alternative strategy based upon large-
scale public sector investment in sustainable and socially necessary 
facilities and services.xliv 
 
Similarly, when Liverpool assumes the mantle of European City of Culture in 
2008 it will find that, as in Glasgow, place-marketing and flagship cultural 
boosterism offer no panaceas to the deep-seated class polarisation in that city 
either.  
 
The physical proximity of different classes in the city often only reinforces their 
social distance. Spatial segregation on class lines has a long pedigree, well 
before any attempt to plan the city, as Engels observed of Manchester in the 
1840s. Urban planning is now virtually synonymous with design, security and 
control. As New Labour’s ‘sustainable communities’ policy puts it: ‘We will put 
‘planning out crime’ at the heart of the planning process.xlv This is part of a 
more general effort to ‘design out’ of the city potentially disorderly spaces. 
One way to do this is through designing public spaces inscribed with a full 
range of the technologies of urban control, such as the ubiquitous CCTV 
apparatus and private security firms. Into these controlled spaces the Home 
Office hope personal identity cards will blend seamlessly. Some see a tension 
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between the urban control apparatus and the urban renaissance 
paraphernalia. Urban design becomes another weapon in the arsenal of a 
middle class resentful that the utopian promise of ‘gentrified’ inner cities has 
to confront the dystopian realities on the ground near-by – vandalism, 
violence, drugs, immigrants, homelessness, begging, and generalised 
impoverishment. Employment insecurity and ravaged property markets help to 
stimulate middle class revenge agendas – what the geographer Neil Smith 
calls ‘revanchism’ –  against the working class and marginalised groups. As 
they try to forcibly ‘re-take’ the city, especially its inner core areas into which 
they have sunk investment, they developed exclusive, fortified ‘gated 
communities’ to spatially enforce class divisions.xlvi Moreover, the state keeps 
in reserve a range of punitive measures like Anti-Social Behaviour Orders 
(ASBOs) as well as the regular forces of law and order. ASBOs can be 
applied for by a range of urban bodies such as local councils, the police, 
housing associations and housing action trusts on an extremely loose 
interpretation of ‘anti-social’ behaviour and evidence based on hearsay, with 
custodial sentences handed down to children that breach them.xlvii All of which 
chimes nicely with New Labour’s re-constitution of morally listless poor 
communities. Middle class revanchism is an exercise in purifying what are 
seen as disorderly and unruly aspects of the city.xlviii In fact, many categories 
of crime, especially street crime, are in slow but gradual decline. Yet, a 
perception of dangerous crime-ridden streets persists, particularly among 
affluent groups. In April 2003 an ICM/Observer poll showed that three out of 
four people think that crime is rising while official figures show a decade-long 
decline. Arguably, this has less to do with the media creating a panic over 
crime levels, as is often claimed, than with actually-existing class divisions in 
the city. The poll showed that alongside the elderly those most worried about 
street crime were not those in deprived areas but those from more affluent 
areas.  
 
This suggests that here is a qualitative difference in how these groups 
experience security. For the rich, fear of crime has led to increasingly 
atomised lifestyles, with wealthier members of society retreating into 
their homes, cars and offices – ironically a trend that disconnects them 
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further from the wider community and increases suspicion of others.xlix 
 
A paranoiac, re-urbanised middle class visits retribution on what are 
perceived to be the source of disturbances to lifestyle consumption patterns.  
 
The State of UK Cities 
The evidence for an ‘urban renaissance’ is highly uneven to say the least.l In 
terms of changes in population, sectoral employment, labour productivity, 
inequalities and ethnicity London and its south-east hinterland contrast 
sharply with the rest of England. Along with New York and Tokyo, London is 
one of three ‘global’ cities.li Globalisation has not dispersed the need for close 
physical proximity of economic activities. The control and command functions 
necessary for capitalism gather around core areas, enabling London to play a 
role unique in the UK, although Edinburgh attempts to play a similar role at a 
much smaller scale in Scotland. Despite the loss of 250,000 jobs in the early 
1990s, London has managed to sustain its base as the locus of economic and 
political power. This is not only because it is physically the densest 
metropolitan conurbation, with the largest concentrations of employment, but 
arguably because it retains so many centres of power, in company 
headquarters, in the City, in government, in banking and finance. If there is a 
new logic to spatial concentrations of corporate power in places like London, 
then it also brings in its wake the production of support functions not usually 
considered to be part of the so-called Knowledge Economy. These include the 
routine and specialised tasks that produce, distribute, maintain, clean, equip 
and house corporate control capabilities. The effect of this clustering of global 
economic activities has been characterised recently by two critics: 
 
They create a stratum of very high earners, whose spending patterns 
then affect retail and housing markets; they attract a highly specialised 
labour force with a disproportionate number of very competitive and/or 
very creative individuals who spin off new businesses and give these 
cities their idiosyncratic character; they have strong speculative 
elements which reinforce cyclical tendencies in the economy; they 
need highly specialised and expensive kinds of working spaces and 
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their demands for space skew property markets.lii 
 
All this emphasis on London’s strategic location for global economic activities 
understates the continuing centrality of its position within the national 
economy and politics of Britain.  
 
London has therefore continued to grow numerically in terms of in-migration 
and employment. Its population is more ethnically diverse than elsewhere. It is 
also among the most productive economic areas in the UK. But London is 
also the most polarised city in terms of extremes of wealth and poverty. In 
contrast, cities in the north and west of England suffer from protracted decline. 
In the last twenty years London’s population growth outstripped the rest of the 
UK. While its growth has slowed down, especially after 2001, it still grew 
faster than other major cities. In the rest of England, larger cities have not 
been re-populated at the same rate as more rural areas. Cities and 
metropolitan areas in the north and west of England continue to lose people, 
albeit at a slower rate. A similar story can be told for employment. Between 
1991 and 2001 London saw a 19 percent growth in employment. This was 
mainly in part-time work, which grew by 47 percent, and, to a much lesser 
extent, self-employment. Of the urban areas with a population of more than 
125,000 employment grew by more than one-fifth in places like Milton Keynes 
(by 50 per cent), Reading Warrington, Cambridge, Crawley and Worthing. 
Outside the south of England employment grew much slower, with large cities 
in the North and West registering a fall in the number of jobs. An exception to 
this trend is Leeds, second to London in terms of employment growth, and far 
ahead of Manchester, the next metropolitan area.  
 
Not only numerically but the sectoral nature of urban employment has 
changed. In the ten years to 2001, manufacturing lost around 1 in 8 jobs, part 
of a long secular decline of employment in that sector. This shift affected 
London as hard as northern cities. For an instance, a skills audit of the 
London Gateway zone found that two-thirds of workers did not have the 
qualifications to take up the service-sector jobs in Canary Wharf. Jobs in 
‘financial services’ grew in most towns and cities but grew faster, by some 50 
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percent, in London. Public sector employment also grew by around ten 
percent in the period, with the exception of London, where it fell slightly. 
Devolution has ensured a faster growth of public sector employment in Cardiff 
and Edinburgh, despite efforts to disperse work to other regions. Edinburgh 
has the highest concentration of civil servants and public sector workers of 
any city in Scotland.liii In terms of labour productivity in cities, at least as 
measured by Gross Value Added per employee, there is a sharp north-south 
divide. In a handful cities and towns in the south and east of England, each 
worker was calculated to produce an average value of £40,000 or more in 
2001: 
 
Apart from London, the highest labour productivity is found in the south 
and east small cities and larger towns like Aldershot, High Wycombe, 
Oxford and Reading. There are no cities further north than Derby or 
further west than Swindon, which have labour productivity higher than 
the average as a whole.liv 
 
In contrast, cities in Scotland lagged well behind even those English cities 
with lower average productivity, with Edinburgh having the highest GVA 
(£22,168), Aberdeen (£19,300) and Glasgow (£19,110), which had the 
highest increase (44 percent) between 1995 and 2001.lv 
 
Population change in UK core conurbations, 1995-2000 
 Population in 1991 
(000s) 
Change 1995-2000 
(percent) 
London 6889.9 5.3 
Manchester 438.5 1.6 
Sheffield 529.3 0.3 
Leeds 717.4 0.2 
Birmingham 1006.5 -0.7 
Glasgow  631.7 -1.5 
Liverpool 480.7 -0.8 
Source: Turok  
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In terms of social structure large disparities exist between and within cities. 
This reflects a broad pattern of regional differences, with a clear north-
west/south-east divide. Such measures disguise huge variations within cities, 
with London having the most extreme inequalities. Life expectancy in England 
is highest in Norwich at 79.8 years and lowest in Liverpool at 75.7 years. 
Thirty percent or more of the population of Cambridge, Oxford and London 
had university-level qualifications, while Barnsley, Grimsby and Mansfield had 
the least. In terms of poverty indices, the highest proportions of adults 
claiming Income Support and Job Seekers allowance benefits in 2003 were in 
Liverpool (18 percent), Hull (17 percent), and Birmingham, Hastings, 
Newcastle and Middlesborough (13 percent). But here London was not far 
behind at 10.3 per cent. Such measures drastically underestimate the scale of 
poverty in UK cities, neglecting as they do other poverty-related benefits such 
as disability, housing and state pensions, and the poverty wages paid to many 
of those in paid employment. Conurbations and large cities in the north and 
west of England typically have twice the average share of the poorest areas. 
Here London again shows the sharpest polarisation of any city in the UK, 
containing within it some of the most affluent areas and some of the poorest 
ones. Like London, Edinburgh also has the starkest extremes of wealth and 
poverty, with unemployment rates of between 20-25 percent to be found in the 
city’s peripheral housing schemes such as Pilton, Muirhouse, Wester Hailes 
and Craigmillar.lvi 
 
It is commonly assumed that cities tend to be more diverse and liberal in 
terms of immigration and ethnicity. While the number of ‘white’ people in 
London and the other urban areas fell by 1.17 million cities were repopulated 
by the 1.13 million ethnic minorities moving into the city. Again, the largest 
volume of increase in inward migration was in London, taking nearly 50 
percent of the national total. Ethnic minorities tend to be concentrated in the 
high density zones of a small number of UK cities. Far from being a drain on 
local services or employment, the economic and social activity of ethnic 
minority groups often helps to rejuvenate urban spaces that would otherwise 
deteriorate even further.lvii The perception that racism has become 
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widespread over the past five years is held by more people in cities and towns 
in the north and west, where more people also report themselves to have 
racial prejudices. In contrast, Londoners are less likely to see themselves as 
racist and fewer think that racism is on the increase. On the other hand, more 
than 90,000 voters in London backed the British National Party in 2004. 
 
 
Table: Perceptions of racial prejudice compared to five years ago 
 London North and 
west urban 
South and 
east urban 
All England 
More 35 53 41 44 
Less 23 18 20 21 
Same 39 26 36 32 
Source: State of the Cities 
 
 
Table: Self-declared racial prejudice 
 London North and 
West urban 
South and 
east urban 
All England 
Some prejudice 29 34 31 31 
No prejudice 70 65 68 67 
Source: State of the Cities 
 
 
 
The Political Economy of Housing 
Housing is always a critical factor in the political economy of the city. Even 
allowing for housing costs a similar geographical north-south pattern 
emerges, despite the scale of property inflation in the south of England. The 
average price of housing shows huge disparities, with London five times more 
expensive than Burnley. Capitalism creates extremely uneven geographies of 
growth and decline. In many northern cities, a vicious cycle has been 
underway for decades. On the back of economic restructuring, the demand for 
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housing skilled workers fell away in many neighbourhoods, resulting in nearly 
a million unoccupied homes and rock bottom property values in parts of the 
North and the Midlands. As the population density of localities falls so it 
becomes unprofitable for retail and services to operate there. But elsewhere, 
with changes to household structure arising from more people living alone for 
longer, the government estimate that an extra 3.8 million households will form 
between 1996 and 2021, an increase of a fifth. There are also more than 
85,000 homeless households in temporary accommodation, most with 
children and disproportionately from ethnic minorities. At the same time, 
around 730,000 dwellings, mostly privately-owned, are lying unoccupied.lviii  
 
Housing the working class in cities in the south, especially but not exclusively 
low-paid public sector workers, is creating huge tensions for servicing the 
future prospects for capital accumulation. More than £200 billion of public 
sector funding, or 60 percent of total spending, goes into English cities and 
towns. New Labour admit that another 200,000 homes are needed in London 
and the South East, over and above their previous estimates in the four 
targeted growth areas: Thames Gateway, London-Stansted-Cambridge 
corridor, Ashford, and Milton Keynes-South Midlands. State intervention in the 
housing market, albeit in the perverse form of ‘private partnerships’, has again 
become essential to trying to sustain the UK’s world city of accumulation, 
London. As Prescott stated: 
 
It involves getting key workers like teachers and nurses into homes in 
London. And its about providing more affordable homes for first time 
purchasers who haven’t been able to get up the housing ladder … 
Many of you will have heard me at the Labour Party conference talking 
about the £60,000 dwelling. Constructing a home for a guaranteed 
price. There was a lot of talk afterwards about how it wasn’t possible. 
Well, I’m going to prove people wrong. We’re going to do it.lix 
 
New Labour’s approach differs from the Tories before them. It is not only the 
emphasis on sustainable communities, partnership and inclusion but also the 
extent to which the local state should step back even further from taking direct 
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responsibility for housing and a more central role is given to private uses of 
public money. To quote Prescott’s speech on the London Gateway: 
 
Michael Heseltine focussed on the East Thames Corridor in 1991. He 
put the Gateway on the map, but I have to say that there is a 
fundamental difference in our approach. We think it is essential to 
develop sustainable communities with the participation of the people 
who live there. Our approach is all about partnership. Private money, 
public money, working together to create sustainable communities. 
Above all, this offers more investment, more quickly, than the state or 
the private sector can deliver on their own.lx 
 
This is simply another way of turning social housing over to the market, using 
public subsidies for privatising housing supply. Local authorities are being 
forced to abandon their ‘landlord function’, that is to directly own and manage 
housing tenancies. Instead city leaders and planners are to remove 
themselves from detailed intervention and manage the competitive city at 
arm’s length as a business. As part of New Labour’s five year plan for 
housing, by 2010 more ‘choice’ will exist for social housing. This will be 
achieved by spending £11.3 billion of public money on ‘Arms Length 
Management Organisations’, Private Finance Initiatives and Stock Transfers. 
Full public ownership and control of social housing is ruled out. As Prescott 
put it to English local authorities: ‘There is no need for a 4th option – and there 
will not be a 4th option – for providing additional funds direct to local 
authorities to meet the target’.lxi Authorities that fail to adopt these measures 
will be denied funding from the Housing Investment Programme to improve 
their housing stock. On the other hand, New Labour will go to any length to 
ensure that housing ownership and control passes out of the hands of the 
local state: ‘We will remove any unnecessary barriers to stock transfer, 
including the cost of early redemption of Public Works Loan Board debt, 
extending arrangements for repaying overhanging debt to partial stock 
transfers, and exploring options for gap funding of negative value housing 
stock’.lxii 
 
 23 
Far from disappearing, then, as a political issue housing has been re-ignited 
as a matter of deep contention.lxiii Nowhere was this more evident than the 
Stock Transfer of Glasgow’s council housing in 2002.lxiv Glasgow has some of 
the poorest quality housing in the UK, with 88 percent of council tenants living 
in the most run down postcode areas and 80 percent in receipt of housing 
benefit or paying no rent. Glasgow City Council also had a huge housing debt 
of some £900 million. The Treasury agreed to abolish this debt at a stroke on 
the transfer of its 80,000 houses to a not-for-profit body, the Glasgow Housing 
Agency. Tenants were faced with the impossible choice of remaining with a 
failed local state option or gambling on what is, through the involvement of 
private finance, effectively privatisation by another name to deliver improved 
living conditions: ‘There is at the heart of all this an irreconcilable conflict 
between the needs of private financiers and the pursuit of meaningful tenant 
empowerment and quality social housing that is democratically controlled’.lxv 
After an intense, multi-million pound marketing campaign Glasgow tenants 
voted for transfer by a small margin. Despite the fact that continued council 
ownership was a far from attractive option the transfer was contested by a 
range of groups. Stock transfer was successfully resisted in other parts of the 
UK, most notably in Birmingham, but also in Camden, Kingston and 
Wrexham. Activists in some of these campaigns could propose a revitalised 
council housing option. In Glasgow, the alternative offered by activists too 
often came down to an unpalatable promise of more of the same from 
Glasgow council. As Mooney and Poole argue: 
 
In the context of the government’s commitment to fiscal ‘prudence’, an 
overriding concern with ‘management’ and managerialism, and with 
‘modernisation’, it is perhaps difficult to envisage that an alternative 
form of social housing could be enacted that would give tenants real 
choice and real control. Defending public sector housing provision in 
Glasgow would arguably have been more successful if the campaign 
had developed clear proposals for tenant involvement and tenant 
participation.lxvi 
 
Coming up with alternative visions of the city should not mean replacing one 
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undemocratic measure with another.  
 
Whose city? 
Cities are permanent sites of struggle and potential places of emancipation. 
By concentrating workers in relatively small spaces they can be both efficient 
and ecological. On the other hand, by spreading fewer people into the thin 
densities of sub-urban and semi-rural life finite resources are used up more 
intensively. This goes against the grain of much anti-urban rhetoric about 
cities as wasteful and ecological damaging. Anti-urban mythology, particularly 
among countryside activists and some environmentalists, claims that cities 
are the antithesis of sustainability. ‘True’ nature is destroyed by the city and 
can only survive outside its rapacious environs. In fact, cities are not 
somehow ‘unnatural’ but places where urban plants and animals can flourish 
in even the most densely populated quarters.lxvii While out-of-town commuters 
congest roads and crowd onto trains, city dwellers are able to walk, cycle or 
use public transport to get around. In London, people are much more likely 
than in any other place to walk for at least 15 minutes a day, partly because 
most Londoners have bus stops and tube stations within half a mile of their 
home. Non-urban populations are significantly more likely to be the sole 
occupant of a car. While congestion charges displace vehicle traffic from the 
core of the city and increase walking cycling and bus use, the wealthiest car 
users can readily afford to pay a levy that gives them less congested city 
streets to drive through. The health impact of urban car use typically falls 
where ring roads skirt past the poorest parts of town rather than on suburban 
commuters who congest them. In the case of industrial location, polluting 
factories are twice as likely to be situated in post-code areas with average 
incomes of less than £15,000. 
 
As they stand, UK cities are far from the utopian images of them. Capitalism 
faces the insurmountable contradiction that it is driven to destroy its own 
lifeblood in the city. Much of the urban fabric is dilapidated, with some 1.3 
million buildings lying empty, and public spaces are turned into hostile 
surveillance zones. The uneven development of UK cities means that they are 
caught up in a contradictory bind. All the possibilities of communal life present 
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themselves but only in highly distorted ways. Town Planning does not plan the 
productive activities or consumption needs of the city but re-arranges the 
scraps left behind in capitalism’s disruptive wake in narrowly specialised 
technical and legal ways. It lacks popular democratic legitimacy, although it 
may grant some form of consultation to local communities affected by 
developers and property speculators. And the results will be tend conform to 
the bland myopia of private developers.  
 
Planning need not mean uniform rows of boxes, varied only by some cheap 
ornamental quirk.  
 
Order and some degree of regulation do not mean turning London or 
Manchester into a vision dredged from the notebook of Albert Speer, the 
Nazi architect. London County Council housing estates from the turn of 
the century, designed by young socialist architects, still surprise with 
their gentle and civilised order. Here were not just so many soulless 
‘housing units’ as we have learnt to call the homes for the poor, but a 
celebration of the ideals of John Ruskin, William Morris and the Arts & 
Crafts movement: formal, ordered, yet not without beauty, designed to 
be a decent home to the poorest Londoners, the cockneys of yesterday, 
the Bengalis of today, and a far cry from either Broadwater Farm or their 
free-market successors.lxviii 
 
Now, we don’t have to accept the wistful nostalgia of Victorian socialist-
architects as a model, just as we have no need to accept Modernist plans 
uncritically either. But at least they pose an alternative vision to the 
impoverished one offered by New Labour. And it is here that the communities 
of resistance need to be couterposed to the New Labour image of 
communities of competition and cohesion. Communities of resistance are 
formed in combining to take action against closures of local services. While 
the state bolsters its coercive arm over working class areas it retreats from the 
provision of basic services – public transport, council housing, health services, 
and leisure facilities. The closure of local swimming pools, for example, can 
rouse local people into action, as evidenced in the intense protest movements 
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in 2001 at Manchester’s Neptune Kingdom, known locally as the Gorton Tub, 
and Glasgow’s Govanhill pool, and help create an active community of 
resistance: 
 
While New Labour is keen to celebrate certain types of active 
communities who engage in ‘approved’ forms of local action, it is also 
prepared to use the full coercive force of the state to deal with active 
communities who challenge the authority of local government. Indeed, 
the experience in Govanhill demonstrates the revanchism of New 
Labour’s project for an urban renaissance based around active 
communities: an iron fist lurks with the velvet glove of New Labour’s 
urban regeneration agenda.lxix 
 
Unspectacular, local resistance is an in-built feature of the urban environment. 
Much of this takes place at subterranean depths, around concrete issues 
(sometimes literally). At times, urban struggles burst beyond the banks of 
local issues and put into sharper relief the wider forces shaping British cities. 
This now hidden, now visible struggle therefore continually poses the question 
– ‘whose city?’ 
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